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Abstract
In this paper we put forward the viewpoint that the notion of stress testing
financial institutions and engineered systems can also be made viable appro-
pos the stress testing an individual’s strength of conviction in a probability
distribution. The difference is interpretation and perspective. To make our
case we consider a game theoretic setup entailing two players, an adversar-
ial C , and an amicable M . The underlying metrics entail a de Finetti style
2-sided bet with asymmetric payoffs as a way to give meaning to lifetime dis-
tributions, an adversarial stress testing function, and a maximization of the
expected utility of betting scores via the Kullback-Liebler discrimination.
Keywords: Cross Entropy, Discrimination Function, Subjective Probability,
Utility.
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0 Preamble: What is “Adversarial Stress Testing”?
The term “stress testing” as used here is not to be interpreted in same vein
as that used in banking and finance, though the intent of both is similar.
Furthermore, “stress testing” is also not to be seen as another label for ac-
celerated life testing in reliability and biometry; the two contexts are
different.
During the financial crisis of the early twenties, banks and financial insti-
tutions were subjected to what is known as a “stress test”. Its aim was to
assess the robustness of these institutions in withstanding disruptions, and
an ability to provide their intended services for a specified timeframe. Stress
tests are generally conducted by regulators, who as representatives of the
public, are mandated to be adversarial. The purpose of this article is to
extend the concept of a stress test of an institution to that of a probabil-
ity distribution (or a survival function). The metric of discussion here is a
lifetime, though the underlying idea need not be limited to such a metric.
Stress testing a probability distribution is not the same as an accelerated
life test done in reliability, or a biostatistician’s dose-response experiment. In
these two scenarios, one assesses an item’s capacity to endure a physical force
by changing the conditions of the test via a systematic increase of the stress
or the dose. Each stress (dose) level spawns its own lifetime distribution and
the challenge is one of extrapolation based on several such distributions. By
contrast, under an adversarial stress testing of a probability distribution, one
assesses the strength of conviction of the individual proposing the distribu-
tion; as such there is only one distribution under discussion. This is done by
changing the conditions of an underlying 2-sided bet by increasing its risk
levels.
To summarize, the duality between an accelerated test and an adversar-
ial stress test can be encapsulated via the statement that in the former one
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assesses an item’s physical strength to endure, whereas in the latter, it is
an individual’s strength of belief that gets scrutinized. Furthermore, in ac-
celerated testing one encounters a family of lifetime distributions, and any
adversarial element, even if present, is not treated explicitly. By contrast,
under an adversarial stress test the focus of attention is the credibility of the
specifier of the distribution that gets evaluated.
There are two other comments to this preamble. The first is that the stress
test of a financial entity is very much in the same spirit as an accelerated
test with binary outcomes. The second is that the adversarial stress test,
to be proposed here, would be a conducive instrument for validating the
survivability of one of a kind items.
1 Adversarial Behavior and Subjective Probability
With the advent of active consumerism, demanding certification, and ag-
gressive litigation, the need for the intensive testing of items and algorithms,
under an adversarial flavor has gained increased prominence. Adversaries are
individuals (or a group of individuals) whose expected utilities differ. Dif-
ferences in expected utilities occur because of differences in their assessed
probabilities or their innate utilities, or both. In rare circumstances, the
expected utilities of adversaries could agree, even though their probabilities
and utilities do not. For probabilities to be different, it is axiomatic that
their interpretation be subjective. Thus the notion of subjective probabili-
ties seems almost mandatory for any version of an adversarial set up. Neither
the relative frequency, nor the propensity interpretation of probability will
be meaningful for every adversarial scenario. Whereas the existence of sub-
jective probabilities has been established by the likes of Ramsey (1931) and
Savage (1954), its operationalization by de Finetti (1974) as a 2-sided mone-
tary bet makes its meaning explicit. We shall lean on this operationalization
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of probability, recognizing that in doing so it is not possible to separate one’s
probability from one’s utility for money, because the two are entangled.
Within the realm of adversarial scenarios, there are two general classes
worthy of distinction. The first is where the adversaries participate in an
economic or strategic conflict, with the intent of annihiliating each other.
Such scenarios are best addressed by game-theoretic methods, where the ac-
tions of one adversary occur as a surprise to the other [cf. von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1944)]. The second adversarial context is the one en-
tailing the exchange of goods by buying, selling, or the certification of an
entity. Here there could be genuine differences of opinion between the ad-
versaries about the underlying probabilities, see, for example, Lindley and
Singpurwalla (1991), (1993). The overall goal of both adversaries is to do
common good bearing in mind the premise that both need each other to
achieve the good. An example is the certification of an aircraft or a piece of
software wherein one member, say a manufacturer M , seeks approval and
acceptance of his/her product by an adversary C , who could be a consumer
(or a regulator). It is not the intent of C to annihilate M , though it is
possible that C ’s actions may eliminate M from future participation. Situ-
ation’s of this type also occur in jurisprudence under courtroom settings. In
the manufacturer-consumer scenario, there is technically speaking, at most
one active adversary; the other player is generally amicable. Specifically, C
can be adversarial to M , but not vice-versa. Indeed, C may choose not to
be adversarial at all. In this case, the scenario boils down to the classical
case of acceptance sampling for quality control, typically addressed by the
Fisher-Neyman-Pearson-Wald test of a hypothesis.
An adversarial scenario can also arise when there is a single C and multiple
M ’s, the latter being adversarial to each other, with the possible goal of an
M annihilating the other M ’s. Game theory enters the picture whenever
the matter of annihilation comes in play, and in the context of several M ’s
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the issue of coalitions among several M ’s, each coalition endeavoring to
annihilate the others, becomes germane.
In what follows, we restrict attention to the case of a single C and a single
M , first articulating the case of C not being adversarial toM , and then the
case when C is an active adversary, because C ’s probability distribution of
a lifetime does not align with that declared by M , or C ’s is required to be
demanding of the viability of M ’s product.
2 The Dispositions of a Passive C and an Amicable M
Consider an item whose lifetime Y takes values y ≥ 0. Suppose that F¯ (y) =
P (Y ≥ y) is absolutely continuous, with probability density f(y) = −dF¯ (y)/dy.
It is common for the survival function F¯ (y) to be specified by M , and this
is what we shall assume. Of relevance to C are lifetimes that are greater
than, or equal to y∗ > 0; y∗ is known as the mission time or a “threshold”,
and its specification tends to be C ’s prerogative. The onus of acceptingM ’s
F¯ (y∗), or challenging it, is also up to C . Suppose that C has no interest
declared in challengingM ’s F¯ (y∗), other than to accept or to reject the item
based on what F¯ (y∗) is. How must C make tangible sense of what F¯ (y∗)
really means? In other words, what is the operational import to C of M ’s
F¯ (y∗)? By operational import, we mean a system of bets between C and M
entailing rewards and penalties.
de Finetti provided an operational interpretation of F¯ (y∗) for y = y∗ in
particular, and for that matter, any y ≥ 0. His notion was that of a 2-sided
monetary bet with a linear state-dependent utility. Whereas de Finetti’s
focus was not on adversarial considerations, his operational interpretation
paves a path towards how one can expand his setup to an adversarial situation
wherein C ’s survival function for Y , G¯(y) differs from the F¯ (y) of M .
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To appreciate this, let us first consider de Finetti’s interpretation of
F¯ (y∗)
def
= p, for 0 < p < 1. Here, the number p implies that M is willing to
stake p on the table in exchange for a reward of +1 from C , if Y ≥ y∗, and
is prepared to lose to C the p staked should Y < y∗. The bet so placed is
against C who stands to gain p if Y < y∗ (i.e. if M fails requirements), and
to lose 1 if Y ≥ y∗ (i.e. M has met requirements). The 2-sidedness of M ’s
bet also requires that M also stake (1-p) in exchange of 1 if Y < y∗, and
lose the (1-p) staked if Y ≥ y∗.
Under the above two bets, one for Y ≥ y∗ and the other against it, the
only action a passive C need take is to choose the side of the bet. In what
follows we always assume that C chooses the first bet. Then for any choice
y∗ of Y , C ’s payoff (or reward) function S(y), y ≥ 0, is of the form shown
in Figure 1. Assuming that p and 1 are monetary units, and assuming that
C ’s utility for money is linear, the S(y) of Figure 1 is also, C ’s utility for
realizing a lifetime Y ≥ y.
Figure 1: C ’s [M ’s] Payoff [Payback] Function S(y)
C ’s passive disposition to M ’s F¯ (y) has resulted in a step function for
C ’s payoff, wherein C receives a constant payoff of +p for all unacceptable
lifetimes, and also a constant payoff −1 for all acceptable lifetimes. In other
words, C ’s utility for money is literally state independent. It was a fea-
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ture like this – among others – that motivated Ramsey, Savage and others
to develop a theory for the simultaneous axiomatization of probability and
utility.
What must C do if the step-function payoff is not acceptable to C , and/or
if C ’s survival function for Y G¯(y) is different from M ’s F¯ (y)? An obvious
strategy would be for C to enticeM , to revise his/her F¯ (y) to C ’s G¯(y), and
repeat the 2-sided bet using G¯(y). However this approach merely translates
the step-shaped payoff function; it does not change its overall character. An
approach for changing the shape of the payoff to something more general is
discussed later in Section 2.1. But before doing so, it is also instructive to
bear in mind the shape ofM ’s payoff function, when C chooses the first of de
Finetti’s 2-sided bet. Its general form is again a step-function that happens
to be a 180◦ rotation of C ’s payoff function about the horizontal axis; see
Figure 2.
Figure 2: M ’s [C ’s] Payoff [Payback] Function −S(y)
Clearly, the payoff toM is a constant +1, irrespective of how much closer,
to the required minimum y∗ the lifetimes are de Finetti’s 2-sided bet therefore
has the feature of providing an unjust utility to M , when it is invoked on
lifetime’s, and when C is a passive consumer.
The payoffs of Figures 1 and 2 are devoid of considerations pertaining
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to the costs of manufacture, the rewards of use, consequences of lost op-
portunities when the required minimum lifetime is not met, and other such
economic matters. The focus of consideration here is mainly the credibility
of M ’s specified F¯ (y). Indeed, Figures 1 and 2 provide an interpretation of
the meaning of a lifetime distribution as seen from the perspective of C and
M , in terms of a de Finetti style 2-sided monetary bet. The two figures are
also representative of C not being adversarial to M and M being amicable
to C . What would the payoff functions look like if C requires that the pay-
off to M encapsulate a better sense of being just, and M abides with this
requirement? This matter is discussed next.
2.1 Passive C and Amicable M with Just Payoffs
A way to obviate the unjust feature of the payoffs given before is for C to
make his(her) payoff function, no more the simple step-function of Figure
2. As will be seen later, this would also be the path for an adversarial
C to express disagreement with M ’s specified F¯ (y), y ≥ 0. For example,
suppose that the payoff to C is of the form indicated in Figure 3. This would
correspond to a 180◦ rotation of Figure 4, which is M ’s payoff function,
when C is not adversarial to M . The payoff function of Figure 4 reflects
the feature of being more just (to C ) than that of Figure 2, because with
the former, the larger the lifetime (over the minimum of y∗), the better the
payoff to M . Indeed, as shown in Figure 4, the payoff to M for lifetimes
larger than y∗, is a concave increasing function of y (≥ y∗). In the interest
of simplicity, for values of y < y∗, the payoff (penalty) to C (M ) is assumed
constant, but this too need not be so.
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Figure 3: C ’s Payoff Function S(y)
Figure 4: M ’s Payoff Function −S(y)
In Figures 3 and 4, the bounds −1 and +1 are arbitrary and so are the
bounds p and −p. Their purpose is to indicate a parallel with those of Figures
1 and 2, where, per de Finetti’s set-up, the payoff functions are bounded by
−1 and +1. As mentioned before, an inevitable consequence of any betting
strategy based on money is the entanglement of probability and the utility
for money. Thus, inherent to any choice by C of a payoff function S(y),
there is a probability distribution for Y , say G¯(y). In Section 4, we shall
allude to the relationship between G¯(y) and S(y). However, before doing so
it may be useful to say a few words about considerations that may go in C ’s
specification of an S(y), y ≥ 0 – C ’s state dependent utility function.
As is typical in reliability and survival analysis applications, it is common
forM to first specify an F¯ (y), and based on this, for C to accept or to reject
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M ’s offer. The uncertain entity in question is an item’s lifetime for which C
has specified a mission time y∗ > 0. Having specified F¯ (y) and nothing more,
an amicable M ’s disposition is to necessarily abide by the payoff function of
Figure 2. If C is not adversarial to M , then C abides by the payoff function
of Figure 1, which is a 180◦ rotation of Figure 2 around its horizontal axis. If
in the interest of receiving a just payoff, M prefers to use the payoff function
of Figure 4, and here again C chooses not to be adversarial to M , then C ’s
payoff function would be that of Figure 3, which is a rotation of Figure 4
around its horizontal axis. Similarly, were C to prefer the payoff function
of Figure 3, and were M feel compelled to abide by C ’s choice, then M ’s
payoff function would be a rotation of Figure 3 around its horizontal axis.
The same is true of all other possible choices for S(y), y ≥ 0.
To summarize, adversarial behavior between C and M is characterized
here in terms of the payoff functions used. Whenever the payoff function
of C is not a 180◦ rotation of the payoff function of M , and vice-versa, an
adversarial scenario arises. Alternatively put, we see adversaries as those
whose payoff functions are not rotationally symmetric. Adversaries do not
abide by what many would claim to be rules of fairplay.
3 The Adversarial C and Amicable M Scenario
Suppose that C has specified a y∗ > 0, and M has declared an F¯ (y), y ≥ 0.
Based on these, and M ’s utility for money, M will arrive upon a payoff
function −S(y) of the forms illustrated in Figures 2 and 4. For purpose of
discussion supposed that it is the “just” payoff of Figure 4 that appeals toM .
Suppose that C is adversarily dispositioned towardsM ; then a payoff that is
(a de Finetti style) symmetric rotation of Figure 4 will not be acceptable to
C . Instead, C will want to propose a payoff function that is more rewarding
to C when y < y∗, and less punitive to C when y ≥ y∗. The nature of what
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this payoff to C should be like, is the topic of this section. But first some
words about the possible reasons underlying C ’s adversarial disposition.
First and formost, C may find M ’s F¯ (y) overly optimistic and may thus
want to challenge F¯ (y) via a stress test. This would especially be so if
C is a regulator who is mandated to thoroughly scrutinize F¯ (y). C may
also want to prove an M wrong with the intent of eliminating the M . We
propose that C ’s instrument for challengingM would be a “stringent” payoff
function which penalizes M heavily when the observed y < y∗, and rewards
M sparingly when y ≥ y∗. Denote this payoff function by S∗(y), and let
S∗(y) = A(y)S(y), where A(y) > 1 when y < y∗ and A(y) ≤ 1, when y ≥ y∗;
see Figure 5. We call A(y) the adversarial stress function. We illustrate,
via Figure 6, A(y)’s effect on M ’s rotated payoff function S(y), to produce
S∗(y) – C ’s adversarial payoff function. Observe that A(y) exaggerates S(y)
for y < y∗, and dampens it for y ≥ y∗. For reasons that will become clear
in the sequel, we suppose that A(y) ≥ 0, for all y ≥ 0, and that A(y) is
also bounded above by B > 0. Thus 0 ≤ A(y) ≤ B ≥ 1. How best must
C choose a meaningful A(y) is the topic of Section 3.1. Figure 5 illustrates
an archetypal form for A(y), and Figure 6 its effect on S(y) – shown by the
dashed lines of Figure 6.
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Figure 5: C ’s Adversarial Stress Function A(y)
Figure 6: C ’s Adversarial Payoff Function S∗(y)
3.1 The Adversarial Stress Function and Betting Scores
The material which follows is an adaptation of some recent work by Shafer
(2019) on statistical communication, adapted for the adversarial lifetime sce-
nario considered here. It is based on the premise that when C and M agree
to an exchange of goods – henceforth the (adversarial) “game” – Y is not
known and thus A(Y ) is a random quantity. Assume that M is confident
of the survivability of his (her) product and is therefore amicable, but not
naive, and agrees to C ’s modification of S(y) to S∗(y) as a payoff func-
tion. M then computes the expect value of A(Y ) with respect to M ’s F¯ (y),
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namely EF [A(Y )] =
∑
y
A(y)f(y), and offers to sell the game to C at the
price EF [A(Y )]. If C accepts M ’s offer, then the amount risked by C is
EF [A(Y )]. Once the game is played, that is Y observed as y, the quantity
A(y)/EF [A(Y )] is C ’s adversarial betting score. This is the factor by which
C ’s amount risked gets multiplied. A large betting score can be seen as
the best evidence C has against F¯ (y); the larger the score, the stronger the
evidence against F¯ (y). C ’s aim therefore is to maximize the betting score,
subject to C ’s limitation on the amount C is willing to risk. Since C ’s
choice of A(y) influences the betting score, A(y) can be seen as the analogue
of a physical stress in an accelerated stress test, or the level of dose in a
dose-response test.
Since A(y) is bounded by B ≥ 1, EF [A(Y )] <∞, and thus EF [A(Y )] can
be normalized to one. When such is the case, C ’s adversarial betting score
is simply A(y). To summarize, in the architecture describe here, there are
three entities of concern to C : an adversarial stress function A(y), y ≥ 0;
an adversarial betting score A(y)/EF [A(Y )], and S
∗(y)−EF [A(Y )], a payoff
function adjusted for the cost to C of subjecting F¯ (y) to a stress-test; note
that S∗(y) − EF [A(Y )] ≥ −1. Whereas M ’s payoff is not of direct concern
here, the – S(y) of Figure 4 should be increased by EF [A(Y )], this being an
added reward to M for being amicable to C ’s stress test.
3.2 Properties of Adversarial Stress Function: Choosing A(y)
Let q(y) = A(y)f(y), and note that
∑
y
q(y) =
∑
y
A(y)f(y) = EF [A(Y )] = 1.
Furthermore, since A(y) ≥ 0, it follows that q(y) ≥ 0; this means that q(y)
can be seen as the probability mass function of some random variable, say Z.
One can think of Z as the random variable that would have directly yielded
C , the adversarial payoff S∗(y). Since A(y) is also C ’s betting score – when
EF [A(y)] is normalized to one, one can also see A(y) as the likelihood ratio
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of the probability mass functions of the random variable Z and the random
variable Y . Bear in mind that the probability mass of Y is specified by M ,
whereas that of Z is specified by C . An equivalence between a likelihood
ratio and a betting score could be a noteworthy observation.
Since the betting score A(y) is the factor by which the money risked by
C gets multiplied, A(y) spawns a utility to C , say U [A(y)]. The bigger
the A(y) the bigger the utility. Suppose that this utility is logarithmic,
namely, U [A(y)] = log2A(y). This utility encapsulates the satisfaction that
C derives in outfoxing M , or in justifying C as an effective regulator. The
utility function need not be logarithmic, but assuming so leads to information
theoretic considerations; these are articulated below.
In decision theory one aims to make choices that maximize an expected
utility, namely, the expected value of log2A(y) = log2(q/f). However, by
the converse of Gibbs Inequality [cf. Kullback (1959)], for any utility like
log2(q/f), taking an expectation with respect to anything other than q will
not maximize the expected utility. We are thus motivated to maximize
Eq[log2
q
f ] = DK−L(q : f), the Kullback-Leibler discrimination between q
(which is a probability), and f (taken as reference) [see Kullback and Leibler
(1951)]. Thus if C wishes to subject f to the most severe adversarial stress-
test as is possible, then C ’s A(y) should be such that DK−L(q : f) is maxi-
mized. Since q(y) = A(y)f(y), DK−L(q : f) = Eq[log2A(y)], C ’s aim would
be to choose that A(y) which maximizes
∑
y
log2A(y)q(y), or equivalently
minimizes −∑
y
log2A(y)q(y), which is like the cross-entropy of A(y), the
adversarial stress function, with respect to the probability q(y).
As an illustration of the workings of the above, suppose that A(y) = 1,
for all y ≥ 0. Now, q = f , and Eq[log2 1] = 0; this means that C will
garner a non-zero betting score only when q 6= f . When A(y) = 0, for all
y ≥ 0, the maximum expected utility is −∞; indeed this is so, if for any y,
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A(y) = 0. Thus we require that A(y) > 0 for all y ≥ 0. Finally, for any
B > 0, the maximum expected utility assuming A(y) = B, for all y, will
be log2B, suggesting that the larger the upper bound on A(y), the larger
the expected utility. But large values of B increase the amount risked by C ,
namely EF [A(Y )]. This in turn places a restriction on how much larger than
one B can be. Once an A(y) is pinned down by C , with 0 < A(y) ≤ B > 1,
the cost adjusted payoff to C , S∗(y)−EF [A(Y )] gets defined, and the game
gets played. By this we mean that Y gets observed as y, and based on what y
is, C makes a choice as to whether to certify or notM ’s specified F¯ (y). Some
strategies for C ’s operationalize of adversarial stress test are given below.
4 Operationalizing the Adversarial Stress Test
Since C ’s cost adjusted payoff is S∗(y)−EF [A(Y )] = A(y)S(y)−EF [A(Y )],
we could suppose that when y < y∗, C should not bear the burden of having
to pay M the amount EF [A(Y )] for the stress test. This of course presumes
that both M and C have agreed to the stress test. However, for the case
y ≥ y∗, C should subsidize the cost of the stress test as a way to compensate
M for C ’s adversarial and distrustful disposition. Thus C ’s risk adjusted
payoff function would take the form shown in Figure 7; compare Figure 6 to
Figure 7.
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Figure 7: C ’s Risk Adjusted Payoff Function
There can be several strategies for C to operationalize the import of Figure
7, vis a vis certifying or notM ’s F¯ (y). Clearly, if y < y∗, C will be reluctant
to certify F¯ (y). When y ≥ y∗, C is faced with a challenge, namely, for
what values of y, y ≥ y˜ ≥ y∗ should F¯ (y) be certified? The answer could
depend C ’s choice of the risk adjusted payoff function. The larger the y,
the larger is S∗(y) − EF [A(Y )], which means the larger the amount that C
has to payback M . This would suggest that y˜ should be as close to y∗ as
is meaningful. Should C want to limit the payback to M at some C > −1,
then y˜ would be that y for which S∗(y˜) − EF [A(Y )] = C. Consequently, C
would certify F¯ (y) whenever the observed lifetime y ≥ y˜.
The strategy proposed above does not take into consideration G¯(y), C ’s
survival function of the item in question. Assuming that C has in mind a
G¯(y), it makes sense to assume that since C is adversarial to M , F¯ (y) ≥
G¯(y), for y ≥ 0; otherwise, it does not make sense to stress test. This in turn
would suggest that G¯(y∗) ≤ F¯ (y∗), so that certifying F¯ (y) when the observed
y ≥ y∗ will be more optimistic than what C believes the lifetimes of the item
will be. One possibility is for C to pin down that y˜ for which G¯(y˜) = F¯ (y∗),
and certify F¯ (y) if the observed y ≥ y˜ ≥ y∗. This schemata will also enable
C to certify F¯ (y) with a high degree of certitude (confidence), by considering
several stress tests, say n, and requiring that for at least k ≤ n of these tests,
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the observed y ≥ y˜; here C ’s probability that y ≥ y˜ is G¯(y˜), and n and k be
chosen to assure a specified degree of certitude.
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